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CONGRESS AND THE COMMUNIST MONOLITH:
COMMUNIST-FRONT ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
Two recent opinions by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB 1 and Veterans
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB 2 - have relaxed the definitional
standards of the Internal Security Act 3 as applied to Communist-front organi-
zations, making it easier to bring organizations within the control provisions
of the statute and raising serious questions of the act's validity tinder the first
amendment. In both cases the Court of Appeals affirmed findings of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board that the two organizations were Communist
fronts and were therefore required to register under the act. This registration
will result in extensive government control over both the organizations and
their members, including submission of membership and financial information,
limitation on use of the mails, and effective denial of security clearance to the
organization's members.4
The Internal Security Act defines a Communist-front organization as
any organization in the United States . . . which (A) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization,6
and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support
to a Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or
the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title.0
1. 331 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 915 (1964). The American
Committee was organized in 1932 or 1933, and has devoted its major efforts to contesting
naturalization and deportation proceedings. 331 F.2d 54.
2. 332 F2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 989 (1964). The Lincoln
Brigade is an organization of veterans who fought in the Brigade during the Spanish
Civil War, and has been relatively inactive in recent years. 331 F.2d 66, 71.
3. 64 Stat. 991-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 783-86 (1958).
4. Title I of the Internal Security Act, with which this Note is concerned, is entitled
the Subversive Activities Control Act and establishes a Subversive Activities Control
Board. This Board has the responsibility for determining whether an organization desig-
nated by the Attorney General is a Communist-action, Communist-front, or Communist-
infiltrated organization. This determination, once final, subjects the organization and Its
members to the registration and control provisions of the act.
5. A Communist-action organization is
(a) any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative
or mission of a foreign government accredited as such by the Department of State)
which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign govern-
ment or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred
to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives
of such world Communist movement as referred to in said section; and (b) any
section, branch, fraction, or cell of any organization defined in subparagraph (a)
of this paragraph which has not complied with the registration requirements of
this subchapter.
64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (3) (1958).
6. 64 Stat. 989, 990 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (4) (1958).
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In determining whether an organization falls within the definition's embrace,
the Subversive Activities Control Board is directed to "take into consideration"
the following factors:
(1) the extent to which persons who are active in its management, direc-
tion, or supervision, whether or not holding office therein, are active in
the management, direction, or supervision of, or as representatives of, any
Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 . . . and (2) the
extent to which its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from any
Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 . . . and (3) the
extent to which its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further or
promote the objectives of any Communist-action organization, Communist
foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in
section 2... and (4) the extent to which the positions taken or advanced
by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those of
any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or
the world Communist movement referred to in section 2....j
The basic problem in the Lincoln Brigade and Anerican Committee cases is
the construction and application of the basic statutory definition as amplified
by these evidentiary factors.
The initial step in the solution of this problem would seem to be determina-
tion of the relationship between the definition and the evidentiary factors. The
only insight the statute affords into this relationship is the opaque mandate
that the Board consider the four factors. A survey of the legislative history of
the act and of the past court decisions interpreting it adds nothing more.8 The
7. 64 Stat. 1000 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(f) (1958).
8. There was some concern during debate before passage that a finding of substantial
presence of just one of the evidentiary factors could satisfy the definition. Indeed, President
Truman cited this possibility in vetoing the bilL 96 COxG. Rzc. 15630 (1950). But this
possibility was rejected by the legislators. Congressman Wood, sponsor of the House
bill, said,
I cannot conceive that the Subversive Activities Control Board or any other court
would be justified in interpreting and applying these provisions so as to reach
such a result.
96 CONG. REc. 15633 (1950).
If the legislative history establishes conclusively, however, that the presence of one
factor alone is not a sufficient basis for determination, it provides few clues as to how
much weight the factors should be given - individually or collectively. What discussion
there is points toward Congress' provision of the factors merely as guides for the Board
and the courts in determining what evidence is relevant - and not exclusive guides at
that. Consider Senator Ferguson's remarks:
The positive and governing fact is that the specified criteria are not absolute
nor the ultimate, either individually or even collectively. They are not to be followed
slavishly. They simply enumerate the types of evidence which the Board must
receive and consider as guides in reaching its ultimate decision.
The ultimate decision will be reached on all the evidence received by the
Board....
96 CoNr. REc. 14531 (1950).
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most authoritative judicial discussion of the relationship is by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB,9 where he
considered the parallel relationship in the Communist-action provisions of the
statute. There he stated only that the Board is required to consider each factor,
and to appraise the probative force of the evidence in relation to each factor.10
The failure of the courts to articulate a clear relationship between the definition
and the evidentiary factors in the Communist-front provisions is more sur-
prising since the first two factors clearly are directed to the control element of
the definition and the latter two to the purpose element.11
The D.C. Circuit's appreciation of the relationship between the definition
and the criteria adds little clarity. For example, in the American Committee
case, the court advanced one view of the relationship on the verbal level of
the opinion while using quite another approach on the operative level. The
court's language implied the necessity for the Board's consideration of all
four evidentiary factors in coming to its conclusion on the control element.12
Operatively, however, the court concentrated on the first factor. For in con-
sidering the control element - whether the organization is "substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization" -
the court turned immediately to the first criterion, and noted that it included
not only persons "active in the management, direction, or supervision" of a
Communist-action organization, but also representatives thereof.18 The entire
inquiry into the control element was framed in terms of this factor, and the
court's consideration of the other three factors was limited to the flat statement
that the Board had considered them and that the record was ample to support
the Board's conclusions.' 4 The use of the first factor to focus more precisely
consideration of the control element seems appropriate. But the court's con-
comitant verbal adherence to all four factors is confusing. How, for example,
does a finding of substantial presence of the third or fourth factors contribute
to a finding of control? Not only does this confusion seem unnecessary, but
it also prevents the establishment of a clear relationship between the definition
and the evidentiary factors for the future guidance of the Board or a court.
The most difficult problem for the court in the American Committee case
was not, however, the control element of the definition, but the purpose ele-
ment - whether the organization is "primarily operated for the purpose of
giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization ... ." In its resolu-
tion of this problem, the court diluted the standards for imposition of the
regulatory provisions.
9. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
10. Id. at 58.
11. In Lincoln Brigade the court admitted that the first and second factors concerned
the control element, the third and fourth factors the purpose element, but insisted on con-
sidering all four factors in relation to the entire definition. 331 F2d at 71.
12. 331 F.2d at 57.
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 57.
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The language of the purpose element seems to require a finding that ac-
tivities be undertaken with the specific intent to aid and support the Communist
movement - that the activities which aid must be done with an intent to aid.
Furthermore, that the intent to aid must be the dominant, if not the exclusive,
purpose of the organization is indicated by the phrase "primarily operated"
in the statutory definition. The significance of the use of the word "primarily"
is underscored by the fact that the phrase "substantially directed" is used in
the control element of the definition. Despite the juxtaposition of the two
words in the same section of the statute and despite the different meanings
ordinarily ascribed to these words,1r the court began the process of statutory
dilution by implying that "primarily" means "substantially.'"
With the benefit of this lessening of the government's evidentiary burden,
the court proceeded to uphold the Board's finding of the requisite purpose.
The court framed its inquiry into purpose primarily in terms of the third
evidentiary factor. Factor three directs consideration of
the extent to which its funds, resources, or personnel are used to further
or promote the objectives of any Communist-action organization, Commu-
nist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to
in section 2....j7
The court construed activities which further Communist objectives to include
activities - ordinarily unobjectionable - which in fact aid the party,28 since
these activities can be a mask behind which Communist power is enhanced.
This construction of the third evidentiary factor, in conjunction with a finding
of Communist control, was used to impute an intent to aid the party sufficient
to satisfy the purpose element of the definition. This reading of the statute
is superficially convincing. And the statutory definition when read alone sup-
ports the court's construction, since its purpose element seems to require an
estimation of the intention with which activities are undertaken rather than
an inquiry as to whether the activities considered in themselves - apart from
the context of control - might be innocent or even laudable.
15. 'Trimarily" means "first of all, fundamentally, principally," while "substantial"
is defined as "that specified to a large degree or in the main, something of moment, an
important or material matter, thing, or part." xVEasm's THnn IN RNATiOuAr, DicriorA"y
(1961). Judge Bazelon, dissenting, also noted the juxtaposition. 331 F.2d at 61 n2.
16. "The Supreme Court has held that 'primarily' does not necessarily mean prin-
cipally, it may mean merely substantially." 331 F.2d at 57. The case on which the court
relied, Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), concerned a provision of the
Banldng Act of 1933 prohibiting a partner or employee of a partnership "primarily
engaged" in underwriting from being employed by a member bank. Under that statute
the prohibition was obviously aimed at preventing a conflict of interest, and the possibility
of such a conflict was evident in the Agnew case. To imply that the Court's construction
of "primarily" in that context - the only time the Supreme Court has construed the
word - was controlling here is not persuasive.
17. 64 Stat 1000 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(f) (1958).
18. 331 F.2d at 59.
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But the court's construction of the third evidentiary factor distorts the
meaning of the word "objectives." There are no grounds for supposing that
"objectives," when used to describe the aims of a Communist organization,
especially when explicit reference is made to section 2 of the act, is used in any
sense other than that of section 2. Section 2 of the act uses "purposes" and
"objectives" interchangeably to refer to the establishment of a "Communist
totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world." 10 This use of
"objectives" in the sense of an ultimate goal was weakened by the court to
use in the sense of a collateral or contributing goal,20 thus making a finding
of purpose easier to establish.
19. 64 Stat 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1958). Section 2(1) defines the "purpose"
of the world Communist movement as the establishment of a "Communist totalitarian
dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide
Communist organization." 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(1) (1958). "Objectives"
for the world Communist movement are not formally defined, but its use in the section
indicates that - despite its number - it is interchangeable with "purpose." Indeed, "pur-
pose" is used in its plural form in subsection (5) in the phrase "in furthering the purposes
of the world Communist movement." 64 Stat. 988 (1950), 50 U.S.C, § 781(5) (1958). In
the next subsection, the act specifies that Communist-action organizations "carry out
the objectives of the world Communist movement" by overthrowing governments and
setting up totalitarian dictatorships. 64 Stat. 988 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(6) (1958). Tie
means cited indicate clearly that "objectives" means "purpose" as defined. "Objectives of
such movement" is used later in the same subsection in what appears to be the same sense.
64 Stat 988 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(6) (1958). Subsection (8) uses both "objectives"
and "purposes," again without distinction and apparently interchangeably. 64 Stat. 988
(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(8) (1958). Subsection (10) discusses the establishment of totali-
tarian dictatorships "in pursuance of communism's stated objectives," 64 Stat. 988 (1950),
50 U.S.C. § 781(10) (1958), yet the only "stated objective" is the "purpose" definition hI
subsection (1). The consistent use of the plural could perhaps be a reference to the stated
purpose and to the institutional characteristics ascribed to it in subsections (2) and (3),
The phrase "stated objectives" is used again in subsection (15) following an implication
of particularized restatement of the purpose as the "overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence." 64 Stat 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(15) (1958).
Given this usage in section 2, there seems little doubt that "purposes" and "objectives"
both refer to the defined "purpose" of the world Communist movement in § 2(1).
There is no doubt that the restricted reading of the statute advocated here narrows
the gap between a Communist-action and a Communist-front organization. In view of
both the severity and the similarity of the controls imposed, discussed in ra, this reading
does not appear inappropriate.
20. 331 F2d at 58, 60.
The effect of this dilution is to uphold a finding of purpose without considering the
third factor - properly understood. Yet to do so is to ignore the mandate of Congress
to take all factors into consideration. It is true that the Communist Party case holds that
there is no necessity for a finding of substantial presence of all evidentiary factors in the
case of a Communist-action organization. Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 58 (1961).
But the statute provides eight rather than four factors for consideration in the case of
a Communist-action organization, and the factors held unnecessary seem to be peripheral.
There is a distinction, moreover, between not finding a substantial presence of all the
factors and not considering a crucial factor correctly.
[Vol. 74: 738
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
The extent of the court's dilution of both the control and purpose elements
becomes apparent in the Lincoln Brigade case, where the government's case
was based almost exclusively on pre-1950 evidence. The Internal Security Act
does not purport to be retroactive in operation, as the court readily admitted.2 '
The definition of a Communist-front organization as well as the rest of the
statute is cast in the present tense; and, as the court pointed out, in view of
the different policy attitudes of the United States toward the Soviet Union in
the 1930's, '40's, and '50's, the date of the evidence was of crucial importanceP
To the reasons given by the court may be added the reason that the act in
both title and concept is a control device, designed to prevent by exposure and
sanction the accomplishment of defined Communist aims in this country 23 it
was not designed to exhume skeletons and condemn them to perpetual infamy.2
Although the Communist Party case held that a court may legitimately rely on
institutional history to establish a context for determination of current control
and purpose,25 not even that case went so far as to hold that the pre-act history
is determinative of an organization's present status.
Despite its recognition of the importance of the date of the evidence, the
court in Lincoln Brigade allowed consideration of pre-1950 evidence on the
grounds that current activities may be viewed "in the context of, or through
the coloration of, the past."28 The extent of this shading becomes apparent on
closer examination. The court's discussion of control was ex-plicitly phrased
in terms of the first evidentiary factor - whether persons active in the control
of the organization are officers, representatives, or functionaries of the party.
In determining control, the Board found that the Brigade had operated for
the past five years into the present through two principal active officers and
that these officers were party functionaries.27 But the court overruled this
finding.28 The court, however, did uphold the Board's finding that four of the
nine members of the Brigade's National Committee were party functionaries.P
Yet 1949 was the date of the latest evidence concerning any of them: Weisman
was said to be a party organizer at that time; Nelson's status was established
21. "This statute is cast in the present tense .... It is designed to compel the public
registration of organizations which, subsequent to the passage of the Act, operate to aid
the aims of the Communist movement." Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64, 67-63
(1963).
22. Id. at 68.
23. See particularly 64 Stat 989, 992-97 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781(15), 784-90 (1958).
Title I of the act is titled "The Subversive Activities Control Act."
24. See, e.g., 64 Stat 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792 (1958), providing for cancellation
of registration of an organization or individual.
25. 367 U.S. 1, 69 (1961).
26. 331 F.2d at 72.
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 7O-71.
29. Id. at 71. This finding reduced to four the number of party functionaries among
the eleven top officers of the Brigade. The Board had found eight to be functionaries, in-
cluding the two principal officers. Id. at 70.
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by evidence dating from 1946; Love's status by his activities in Spain in 1938;
and Smith's status by his continued loyalty to Earl Browder after the latter
was expelled from the party in 1946.0 Even assuming the general relevance
of pre-act evidence, the staleness of this particular evidence greatly weakens
its probative force.
Having found that four members of the National Committee were party
functionaries, the court inferred their participation in management of the
Brigade from their membership on the National Committee upon the assump-
tion - unsupported by evidence - that it was reasonable to assume a small
National Committee had duties relating to management.8' Perhaps recognizing
the tenuous nature of the foregoing evidence, the court stopped short of con-
cluding that the control element had been satisfied. Rather it buoyed its position
by asserting record support for the other three evidentiary factors, for the
"Board must take into consideration all four of these specifications in determin-
ing the applicability of the whole of the statutory definition."3 2 Not only did
the court not explain how consideration of the other factors helped establish
control by the party, but it also failed to reconcile this position with its earlier
identification between the control element and the first factor.
Even assuming that consideration of the other three factors was relevant in
determining control, most of that evidence, as the court acknowledged, con-
cerned pre-19 50 activities.3 Nor did the Brigade's activities since passage
of the act appear particularly ominous.3 The only damning evidence since
passage of the act to which the court referred concerned the "non-deviation"
evidentiary factor - whether the Brigade's policy positions deviated from0
those of the party. Surprisingly, no reference to the purpose element of the
definition was made during this non-deviation discussion. Yet at the conclusion
of this discussion the court, which had been unable to uphold a finding of
control on the basis of Brigade leadership, abruptly and without further expla-
nation approved the Board's findings of both the control and the purpose ele-
ments3 5
30. Id. at 70.
31. How "reasonable" this inference and this assumption were may be viewed In the
light of the absence of evidence that the two principal officers were party functionaries,
the evidence that a minority of the National Committee were functionaries, and in the
contention of the Brigade - contradicted only by one letter of April 25, 1952, signed
by the entire National Committee - that the executive board had not functioned since
1949. Id. at 70.
32. Id. at 71.
33. Id. at 70.
34. The Brigade says in its brief to us that since . . . [passage of the Act] its ac-
tivities have consisted of social affairs, statements in opposition to the Franco
regime, the rehabilitation of Brigade members in need of aid, support of its members
indicted under the Smith Act, particularly Nelson and Weissman, and defense of
itself in the present proceeding. The report of the Board does not materially contra-
dict this factual position.
Id. at 71.
35. Id. at 72-73.
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The court's focus on the non-deviation evidence may be criticized not only
for its failure to demonstrate Communist control of the Brigade either in the
pre-1950 or post-1950 years, but also because it, in effect, reduced the purpose
element of the definition to a less than convincing demonstration of non-
deviation. Non-deviation standing alone seems to have little probative force
on the issue of purpose; opposition to the Internal Security Act, for example,
is hardly proof of an intent to aid the party, and the same may be said of other
lawful causes, which may be shared with the party only by coincidence. ° More-
over, by allowing the purpose element of the statutory definition to be satisfied
by a mere showing of non-deviation, the court in Lincoln Brigade sacrificed
the last mooring that the American Committee case had in the statutory defi-
nition - the inference of a purpose to aid the party drawn, in part, from a
clear finding of control. Amid the confusion resulting from its failure to estab-
lish a clear relationship between the elements of the definition and the evi-
dentiary factors, the court ironically affirmed a finding of both control and
purpose when the evidence relevant to each element alone was insufficient to
establish its existence.
In sum, the court's construction of the act in the Lincoln Brigade and
American Committee cases broadened the statutory provisions in two ways:
by the inclusion of collateral as well as ultimate objectives of the party with-
in the word "objectives" in the third evidentiary factor, thereby allowing pro-
scription of an organization which in no way attempted direct advancement
of those ultimate objectives; and by the satisfaction of the purpose element
by merely finding, in effect, non-deviation, thereby undercutting the require-
ment of an intent on the part of the organization to aid the party.
This broadening of the statute extends the reach of the act into the area
of protected first amendment freedoms and raises serious constitutional ques-
tions.3 7 The first such question stems from De Jonge z'. Oregon 3s and Scales
v. United States.39 These cases establish the proposition that activities within
the ambit of the first amendment may not be curtailed by criminal sanctions
when the activities themselves are lawful. In Dc Jonge (a criminal syndicalism
prosecution under Oregon law) the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment prohibited punishment of a Communist Party member for participation
in a lawful meeting. First amendment protection was accorded even though
the organization itself engaged in unlawful activity.40 The Court reaffirmed this
policy in Scales, even though upholding a Smith Act conviction, by requiring
36. The satisfaction of the purpose element in both the American Committee and
Lincoln Brigade cases, then, relies heavily upon the non-deviation factor. And this
reliance illustrates a role for that factor closely akin to that envisioned by then-Repre-
sentative Nixon in debate prior to passage: "[I]f this particular standard is stricken out,
it would be virtually impossible in many cases to get sufficient evidence before the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board to justify a finding that an organization was a Com-
munist front" 96 CoNG. R. 13764 (1950).
37. This is the position taken by Judge Bazelon in dissent.
38. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
39. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
40. 299 U.S. 353, 359-60, 365 (1937).
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proof not only of membership in the party which engaged in illegal activity,
but also of intent to advance its illegal objectives. 41
Of course, the laws involved in Do Jonge and Scales involved criminal sanc-
tions. And it might be argued that the Communist Party case, which upheld
the constitutionality of the registration provisions as applied to Communist-
action organizations, implied a refusal to extend the rationale of Do Jonge
and Scales since the Internal Security Act did not itself make the party's ac-
tivity illegal and since only civil regulations were imposed. 42 If this were all,
the statutory provisions applied to the American Committee and the Lincoln
Brigade would appear constitutional under the same rationale, since the
Communist-front provisions also apply civil rather than criminal sanctions.
But it cannot be inferred from the failure of the court in the Communist Party
case to find specifically that the party was engaged in criminal activity, that
the Court viewed the activities of the party as legal. The finding of protracted
organizational activity under foreign domination having as its objective the
establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship was tantamount to a finding of
conduct made criminal by the Smith Act.43 If illegal activity be attributed to
the party, then the Communist Party case seems clearly outside the rule sug-
gested by De Jonge and Scales - that innocent activity or innocent participa-
tion in illegal activity are protected by the first amendment.
The American Committee and Lincoln Brigade cases, unlike the Communist
Party case, involve activities not prohibited by the Smith Act or any other
statutes. And since the Communist Party case apparently did not decide that
De Jonge and Scales are inapplicable when civil sanctions are used to curtail
lawful activities, that question remains open. The consequences of registration
under the Internal Security Act, moreover, are sufficiently severe to diminish
the conceptual gap between those "civil" sanctions and more traditional crimi-
nal sanctions. The sanctions, for example, imposed on members of Communist-
front organizations 44 include effective denial of security clearance,46 denial of
41. If there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims [as contrasted with a criminal conspiracy], there would
indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would
be impaired . .. [T]he member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the
advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within the ban of the
statute....
367 U.S. at 229.
42. Criminal penalties are imposed, however, for failure to register. 64 Stat. 1002
(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794 (1958).
43. 54 Stat 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
44. The registration provisions themselves require that organizations determined
to be Communist fronts submit annual registration statements containing 1) the name
of the organization and the address of its principal office, 2) the name, alias, address, title,
and duties of current officers or officers who have served within the preceding twelve
months, and 3) an accounting, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the At-
torney General, of money received and the sources thereof and money expended and
the purposes therefor. 64 Stat. 994 (1950), U.S.C. § 786(b),(d) (1958).
45. 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1958).
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government employment,40 effective denial of defense industry employment,4T
and denial of passport.48 In the light of the lawfulness of the activities of the
American Committee and the Lincoln Brigade and of the severity of the sanc-
tions imposed upon the organizations and their members, the argument for
the inapplicability of De Jonge and Scales on the grounds of a distinction be-
tween civil and criminal sanctions is not persuasive. Once this possible consti-
tutional infirmity of the Communist-front provisions is recognized, it would
seem that a courL :- obligated to construe the act narrowly, thereby leading to
a reversal of the Board's registration order, in order to avoid this constitu-
tional issue.49
Even if the rationale of De $onge and Scales were found inapplicable to the
cases at hand, it is clear, as the Communist Party case admittedr0 that the
"chilling effect" of the registration requirements upon the exercise of first
amendment rights is sufficient to require a balancing of this imposition against
the "magnitude of the public interests which the registration and disclosure
provisions are designed to protect."51 The Community Party court framed
this balance in terms of "the impediments which particular governmental regu-
lation causes to entire freedom of individual action" and "the value to the public
of the ends which the regulation may achieve."5 2 The Communist Party case
found that the public interest justified imposition of the registration controls
against Communist-action organizations. But it carefully and specifically con-
fined its holding to the case of foreign-dominated organizations with objectives
of overthrowing the government and establishing a totalitarian regime. This
careful limitation seems to make its own argument against automatic extension
of the Communist Party case adjudication of constitutionality to the instant
cases, in which the organizations were not shown to have either direct foreign
domination or the ultimate objectives of the Communist Party. It is doubtful,
then, whether application of the balancing test would result in justification of
the control provisions, and this possibility presents another compelling reason
for construing the statute narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional question.
Aside from these two constitutional issues, there are other considerations
which should impel a court to construe the Internal Security Act restrictively.
The act is unusual in that it is explicitly based upon extensive congressional
findings of "fact" concerning the nature of the world Communist movement
46. 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (B) (1958).
47. 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (C) (1958).
48. 64 Stat 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958). This provision, § 6 of the act, was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on first amendment grounds in Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
49. For expressions of this widely accepted canon of statutory construction, see
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932) ; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929) ; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v.
United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928).
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and the danger of that movement to the internal security of the United States60
These findings were made as a result of a decade's investigation by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities." The reasons for the inclusion of these
findings in the act are not explicitly stated, but it seems reasonable to ascribe
at least two purposes to Congress: to ensure the act's constitutionality by
spelling out the dangers motivating passage of the act, and to provide a con-
trolling legislative history setting forth explicitly the intent with which Congress
passed the act.
But the "facts" found by Congress in 1950 are necessarily tied to the con-
ditions and circumstances under which they were found. Their accuracy, and
even their relevance, in future years is limited by the degree to which the
conditions under which they were found remain unchanged. The act was
passed in 1950, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war and amid
the rising tide of McCarthyism. To read the act is to sense the mood of
Congress:
The Communist movement in the United States is an organization
numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined.
Awaiting and seeking to advance a moment when the United States may
be so far extended by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or
so far in industrial or financial straits, that overthrow of the Government
of the United States by force and violence may seem possible of achieve-
ment, it seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of schooling
and indoctrination. Such preparations by Communist organizations in
other countries have aided in supplanting existing governments. The
Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated ob-
jectives, the recent successes of Communist methods in other countries,
and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself,
present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States and
to the existence of free American institutions ... .
In this passage, Congress set forth three factors which together constitute a
clear and present danger to United States security and which designate condi-
tions motivating passage of the act: 1) a strong Communist organization
within this country intent on overthrowing the government and establishing
a totalitarian dictatorship; 2) recent successes by similar organizations in
other countries; 3) a monolithic, highly disciplined, worldwide movement."
In 1965, however, the truth of these bases of the statute is no longer evident.
While the effective strength of the Communist Party in this country is diffi-
cult to determine accurately, in 1961 party membership was estimated at
10,000, half the party strength in 1956.57 It is at least doubtful that the Com-
53. 64 Stat. 987-89 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1958).
54. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVicE 3886 (1950).
55. 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(15) (1958).
56. The addition of detail in this denotation is drawn from the subsections of thie
act immediately preceding the quoted passage. See note 53 supra.
57. Avakumovic, World Communism in Figures, 17 INT'" J, 151, 152 (1962). Party
membership was 20,000 in 1956, 7,000 in 1957, and 10,000 in 1961. No estimates are quoted
for the Communist Party of the United States of America for 1939 and 1947.
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munist Party in the United States in the 1960's is as strong as it %%as at the
time of passage of the act. Indeed, its strength has probably lessened.0 Since
the passage of the act, moreover, there has been no takeover by Communists of
industrialized countries comparable to the fall of Eastern Europe in the years
immediately following World War II and immediately preceding the passage
of the act. Similarly, events of the last decade and a half have clearly shattered
the notion that the world Communist movement is a monolithP0 The death
of Stalin in 1953 and the emergence of Communist China as a major power
have triggered a fragmentation of the Communist movement, which is con-
tinuing, perhaps at an accelerated pace, today c0 In President Johnson's words,
"In [the last four years] ... no new nation has become Communist, and the
58. One helpful index of the degree of national concern about the party is the volume
of periodical literature concerning it; that volume has declined markedly in the last 15
years. See, e.g., the material indexed in PUBLc AFFAIRS INFoRmATioN SERvrcE and READ-
ER'S GUIDE To PmonlcAL LITERATURE over this period.
59. The change has been well stated by Wolfgang Leonhard:
For almost a quarter century, from 1929 until 1953, international communism was
characterized first and foremost by monolithic unity. All the Communist parties
of the world (with the exception, since 1948, of the Yugoslav one) vere subordi-
nated to Stalin's leadership in Moscow. Every political shift of the Kremlin was
obeyed by Communist parties from Germany to Indonesia. One nod from Moscow
was all that was needed to remove a displeasing leader and to appoint a desirable
one; one phrase in a Soviet article was enough to alter overnight the line of any
party. The uniform monotony went so far that Communist Part), resolutions in
Sweden, Ceylon or Venezuela could hardly be distinguished one from the other. To
be sure, during this period there existed, probably more than has been generally
assumed until now, serious opposition to Soviet domination, criticism of the line
handed down from Moscow, oppositionist currents and different concepts and con-
troversies, but these could not be aired openly in the conditions prevailing at that
time. In that quarter century the international Communist movement seemed -
not only to the outside world, but even to many of its o\vn members - like an
instrument uniformly directed and led from Moscow, without any independence
whatsoever.
All this now belongs to the past. Within a few years the Communist world
movement has departed from its earlier monolithic structure to an astonishing
extent and with startling swiftness. This development has led to the formation
within the international Communist movement of several political groupings which
take entirely different attitudes toward decisive political questions; it has led to
open controversies between these different groupings and, consequently to new
relations within the movement as a whole.
Leonhard, A World In Disarray, 13 PROBL.EMS OF ComsUxSM 16 (1964). See generally
DALi=, DIERsrrY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISMs (1963); LAQUER AND LABDEZ, POLY-
CENTRIS : THE NEw FACrOR IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM (1962); 12 PROBLEMS Or
Co uaumsm (1963); Lowenthal, Communists of the World Unite? N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 24.
60. The Polish and Italian parties have taken the lead in arguing for more genuine
equality and autonomy among the parties, and their position has been formally recognized
in Conununist documents since 1957. DALLIN, op. cit. supra note 59 at -xix. And in 1960
the Soviet Communist Party indicated that it did not wish to be designated as the leading
Communist Party. Ibid.
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unity of the Communist empire has begun to crumble."0 1 One result of this
fragmentation has been a relaxation of internal discipline and a dispersion of
control and authority within the international Communist structure. These
developments imply that the integrity of the worldwide movement's power
base is disintegrating, with a consequent weakening of both control of and
support for the internal Communist Party by the international movement. The
coupling of these developments with the decline in internal party numerical
strength has undermined the congressional findings upon which the Internal
Security Act was based.
If the act's findings of fact be viewed as an exposition of the magnitude of
the public interest which constitutionally justifies the imposition of controls,
the questionable validity of those facts today may alter the constitutional bal-
ance. To avoid making the constitutional decision under these changed circum-
tances, the court should construe the act narrowly.
But the changed conditions since the congressional findings of fact have
broader implications than the casting of doubt upon the act's constitutional
justification. For the continued validity of these findings of fact is crucial to
application of the act in accord with congressional purpose. That purpose
is to preserve and protect the "security of the TJnited States" and the "existence
of free American institutions" from the "clear and present danger" of sub-
version by the internal Communist movement, one tentacle of an octopus-like
world movement tightly controlled by a foreign government. To the extent
that this danger has diminished, congressional purpose is satisfied. The broad
application of the act in the face of doubtful contemporary validity of the
findings of fact justifying its passage may be a distortion rather than a ful-
fillment of congressional purpose. 2 To avoid guessing about congressional
61. 111 CONG. REc. 27 (1965) (State of Union Message).
62. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), and Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543 (1924), concerned the District of Columbia Rent Act, which established tenant and
rate controls within the District of Columbia. This act was originally passed and justified
by Congress as a war emergency measure in 1919. Its life was extended in 1922 for two
more years. The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, upheld the act in the
Hirsh case, though noting that factual determination by Congress of an emergency wan
not conclusive. In Chastleton, the Court remanded for determination of factual justification
as of the times in question. The Court, again speaking through Mr. Justice -Iolime,
said that while respect was due the legislature's determination of fact, the Court was
not at liberty to shut its eyes to a legislative mischaracterization as of the time of passage;
and as to future times, "A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the
facts change even though valid when passed." 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924).
Nor is the Communist Party case to the contrary. Though the opinion is murky on
this point, it does not preclude consideration of the argument just made. It is true that
the Court stated that the congressional findings of fact were "not open to re-examination
by the Board." 367 U.S. 1, 112 (1961). While this would seem to bind the Board per-
petually to what was the case in 1950, Mr. Justice Frankfurter volatilized the "facts" into
"defining terms whose truth, as such, is irrelevant to the issues in such proceedings,"
Ibid. Thus the finding of § 2 enumerates the characteristics of the "world Communist
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intent in the light of changed conditions, the court should steer the conservative
course of narrow construction of the statute. This conservative course, more-
over, would uphold the values of a democratic society by preventing, in the
absence of clear congressional design, indiscriminate application of harsh
civil sanctions and the attendant infringement of the right of free speech and
association. This is not to suggest that the court substitute its judgment for
that of Congress by insisting that the congressional findings be re-examined
in every prosecution. Nor is it to suggest that the court abrogate the act by
refusing to enforce it on grounds of changed conditions. It is to suggest merely
that substantial change from the context in which its findings were made,
change casting serious doubt upon their continued validity, dictates a strict
reading of the statutory provisions.
The doubtful validity today of the facts upon which the act is based and
the questionable constitutionality of its broad construction reinforce the con-
clusions drawn from a close reading of the statute. These conclusions indicate
that a broad application of the act - the reading of "objectives" in the third
evidentiary factor to mean objectives of an organization collaterally to aid
the Communist Party and the satisfaction of the purpose element of the defi-
nition by a tenuous showing of control by the party and a substantial degree
of non-deviation from the policy positions of the party - is a misconstruction
of the act. And in both the Amnerican Committee and Lincoln Brigade cases
this misconstruction has resulted in affirmance of a Board registration order
against organizations whose activities were admittedly lawful and whose pur-
poses to aid the Communist Party were not clearly demonstrated.
movement" as that movement existed in 1950. The board or a reviewing court, then, is
able to say, as a matter of "statutory interpretation," that "the 'world Communist move-
ment,' as Congress meant the term in 1950... no longer exists, or that Country X or Y,
not the Soviet Union, now directs it." Id. at 113. The determinations advocated here -
that the world movement is no longer a monolith, and that the internal party has declined
in strength - are similar to the examples used by the court justifying "statutory con-
struction." The Communist Party case, therefore, offers no authority for the contention
that a court is irrevocably tied to the congressional findings of fact rooted in the 1950
context.
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